Episode #1, At the Crossroads of Human Rights & Geopolitics: Syria's Complexity and the Massacres of Alawites

Murad Ismael’s first podcast explores the intersection of human rights, politics, and global conflicts, with a focus on the Middle East. He shares how the 2014 ISIS genocide against the Yazidis changed his life and led him to advocacy. Murad highlights global inaction in crises like the Alawite massacres in Syria, examines major conflicts including Israel-Palestine, Iraq, and Ukraine, and discusses the geopolitical forces shaping human rights violations. He analyzes Syria’s shifting power dynamics and explores the struggles of Kurdish and minority communities. The podcast also delves into how terrorist groups like ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and HTS evolve and influence global politics. Through these deep discussions, Murad encourages critical thinking, awareness, and engagement with global affairs. Watch on YouTube: https://youtu.be/RPTJyUzrOJw

Transcript

Murad: Hello, my name is Murad Ismael and welcome to my first ever podcast. Now, I will take the first segment of this talking about what this podcast will be about and why I want to bring this to your attention. This podcast will focus on human rights and intersection with the politics and digital politics on the international level, not focused on a certain area. Even though the same experience is mostly good in the Middle East and that's where I'm from. But I would like to discuss these human rights issues, intersection with digital politics and in a way why we see things the way we see them. Especially at a time I would say in the world where we see a lot of issues with what's happening in the Middle East, for example, between Israel and Palestine and Hamas, what's happening in Syria as a country, what's happening in the broader region of the Middle East. What happened in Iraq, for example, 2014, I would address this that ISIS committed and kind of the background of that. But on the international level as well, we see issues like the Ukraine war that really has a serious impact on everyone, not just the Ukrainians and the Russians. And let's say the changes in the US administration position on that and the geopolitical context between Russia, NATO and the US on one side, the German on the other side.

The option is to say the Ukrainians have to stop this war and how things change for them and how much human rights basically violations that are taking place within that cloud of geopolitics and political dynamics. I would like to probably just start by discussing the cases that I'm most knowledgeable about and then move to other cases and invite also guests along the way to come and speak. I don't know how this will go. This is my first experience in the podcast or in breaking, let's say, working in the media directly. I've done work for the for mainly for the Yazidi community through the advocacy campaign I did between 2014 and now but I have not worked in this area extensively. So I will see how it goes. But but I think really, the whole idea of this podcast is to to bring what I think is important to the viewer and to the world. In terms of the discussions that should take place. And I see importance in that because it does impact eventually what happens in the geopolitical level, what happens in the political level eventually impacts people's lives. And in some cases could be severe impact. The case of my community, the Yazidi community that many may know, many also don't know about it. In 2014, the Yazidi community were subject to genocide on the hands of the so called Islamic State. Before that I, me being a from the Yazidi community, I was not in Sinjar when that happened. I was not in the in the area of that I was in the United States. But what happened really, I would say changed the way I I myself live changed the way I myself perceive the world. But also the work I did along with other with others. Post 2014, in terms of the advocacy, the meetings, the meeting with the officials in many countries, the advocacy campaign that they did to the genocide in more than 15 countries, and the whole the whole story and learning that that got from that, I think that that worth sharing, but also that worth sharing, because in other contexts is also can be used and can be useful. And, you know, of course, I did not want to do to do this type of work. In 2014, when the Yazidi community was subject to these atrocities, I was a graduate student with the University of Houston doing my master's in geophysics. This was not my field. But you know, seeing people close to me, relatives, neighbors, the entire community classmates, being driven from their homes for no reason just for being as it is and to be killed in masses, some cases to be enslaved. More than 7000 years, he these were taken as captives were enslaved by the by Isis and they were treated horrible treatment. I will not work in no I will not talk in details about that. But but that really, you know, changed the way I I did and started focusing on on this. Why? Well, the first question why this happened to my people. We were Yazidi community was not a big community that that was competing for power, for example, it wasn't that geopolitically important wasn't that it was not war with another group, for example. But still that happened to us. So you know, I would say one thing is, if it can happen to community like Yazidis in Iraq, it could happen then to anyone else. It could happen. In fact, we've seen like how quickly things change, how quickly things changed in, in many places, we see the impact of this geopolitical shift and this this this this ideological shift as well, which is which is, which is very connected on impact on even people's lives in the US here or in Geneva, for example, we had terrorist attacks in Geneva just just a couple couple of weeks ago. We see how how this relationship between the human rights and between the politics and the geopolitics really plays in everyone's life. And in fact, everyone, even even even some cases, let's say, you know, not as a first degree, but second, third degree. For me, I think I didn't. So not everyone cares about either human rights or geopolitics. And of course, I think that I was one of the people who did not care that much before 2014 until I saw my community going through this, I didn't really follow much attention or didn't follow much of what is happening on the global stage. But of course, I started when you know, my own people were subject to it. But I think, you know, now going back, it's really important on the personal level to know this, because it could impact you, but also it impacts the world around you, it impacts the communities around you. And I think eventually, eventually, a world that's just too unfair, should not be acceptable, a world that, you know, human beings of the 21st century are still, you know, killed for who they are. Just walking to the studio today, you know, reading the news that more than more than, you know, estimated 200 to 300 Alawite in Syria have been murdered by the HTS in Syria, the group that took over the power in Syria just just a few months ago. Now that group is going into the minority areas and executing people for who they are, basically. And there's not much attention, you know, several few articles, I would say there's no more attention that's given to the Alawites, of course, applied that's going on right now. Same thing that was the case in for the Yazidis in 2014. We were going to the media, we were going to the international community, but, you know, we will go sometimes to report that 7,000 Yazidis were killed or enslaved, but then we'll come back home, we will watch and there will be, you know, in the news, they will say, you know, few hundred Yazidis were reportedly killed or enslaved or taken. It took us about two or three years just to establish the truth what happened. It took us like two years of consistent campaign just to establish what was happening because, you know, the world was not willing to accept what was happening. And I think today, you know, what's happening to the Alawites today, just this morning, I don't see a huge willingness in the international world in general to acknowledge that this is happening right now. And of course, the bigger than that, you know, nobody acknowledges, but also nobody acts on it. Nobody acts to prevent it. It is a subject to the geopolitics of the Middle East, of Syria, for example, right now, you know, the change of regime in Syria and the Islamists, which they are, by the way, former jihadists from Al Qaeda, from ISIS, from Al Nusra that came together to create HTS. HTS was empowered for a couple of years in northern Syria, supported by Turkey, by Qatar, by other countries in the Middle East who supported them to stay in power. And then at the moment when the whole geopolitical situation in the Middle East changed, with the dynamics of the of Israel Hamas conflict, but that's where they say that was the, you know, the conflict that people talk about, but was mainly original conflict between Iran and Israel, that Iran eventually really lost that, I would say that to Israel and that led into the fall of Hamas in a big way, but also Hezbollah and then also the fall of the Assad regime in Syria. So Syria that's known, for example, historically to be under influence of Iran, a close ally to Iran, Assad was, Alawite himself from a minority that basically are seen as Shia, so Shia, they are seen as Shias, but in fact they are their own ethnic group, but they do share a lot of elements with the Shia and they were very close with Iran and I think also was a way for Assad, not just being Shia, but also being a minority in power of a Sunni majority country in Syria. I know he needed a backing of a country and Iran was the country to back back on. So when Iran lost in the region, of course, Assad weakened and the Islamists in the north, supported by Turkey. So Turkey also is a country that is really getting stronger and stronger, I would say by the year, not by the day, that benefits also from weakness or from weakening of Iran and then they managed to really take over Syria. So of course that regime change in Syria, which is a post, really 50 plus years of Assad rule, which was a cruel and criminal rule that really committed a lot of massacres. We used chemical weapons, for example, against the people and used horrific, we all remember the horrific scenes from Aleppo, for example, dropping barrels of explosives over people's houses. These images will never go away for us, for anyone who knows about the situation. The regime forced 12 million Syrians out, so the regime really didn't need to go, but for me, someone who was watching this for years, for years this happened, Assad was doing all that and nobody said no in a big way. Nobody said no to it. As I said, the forces created within Syria, whether it's the SDF, the Kurdish-led group, Kurdish-led US-backed group in the northeast, and the Islamists, HTS and others who are the offshoot of who are the offshoot of Baydha and Nusrah in the north, to really accept internal dynamics of Syria, internationally speaking. The world was okay with Assad doing all that, the world was okay with Assad bombing Syrians, the world was okay with him removing 12 million people.

And for me, someone now looking back again to what the Yezidi suffered, and to always try to see that really people do politics and geopolitics for the people, for the greater good of people, because power does impact everyone in a geographic area, and countries that say like the US, the power affects everyone in the world, on the global stage, in any place, any small place, even in Syria, where it's impacted heavily by the politics, or the geopolitics, and the decisions made in the United States, or in countries like Europe, Russia, China, these big countries who make these decisions impact people's life.

So again, for me seeing for years Assad did all that crimes, and basically nobody said don't do that. I mean, they told them don't do that, but nobody acted on it. Of course, a lot of red lines were patched, for example, using the chemical weapons in Syria, and the result of that, you know, Assad really no way succeeded in the war until the situation between Iran and Israel developed it. So Assad was successful in terms of keeping power, and the world started embracing him back. We saw Assad, for example, going into conferences in Saudi Arabia, and other countries where he was welcomed, he was seen again as the leader of Syria. So nobody saw that was happening. So the other thing that nobody saw that the regime change in Syria was happening, everybody was really happy, or like was okay with Assad staying in power despite all the crimes he committed, despite all the millions of Syrians who were outside the country. But then things changed, and this is also important, you know, to stay, I think, to stay objective in your readings about what's happening, because things sometimes change as nobody expected. It's in Syria that nobody expected. So, you know, let's say within within within the dynamics, the regional dynamics in Syria, within the internal dynamics in Syria, as well, the regional and internal, internal in term of, you know, both the atrocities that Assad committed and, you know, being belonging, let's say, to the Alawite community against the majority of just Sunni Arab Arab, and then again, also the new dynamics that developing in Syria, for example, with the Kurds are taking, you know, more,

I would say a stronger position in the region, being in power, and then in the northeast, in alliance with the Arabs, with Arab tribes in the region, that really kind of this is the first time we see Syria outside that, that box or the bucket or the books that Assad created, of course, to cruelty, but he created a united, a unified Syria. Maybe the border drawn with blood, but it was a unified Syria. But now we see that, that Syria is breaking up in many ways. And we see, as I say, we see the Kurds in the north, the Kurds and the Arabs in the north and northeast, which also they have their own, let's say, complications and their own, of course, complications in terms of Turkey. And that plays into another conflict, which is the Turkish-Kurdish conflict, which has been going on for, I mean, for at least 50 years. I mean, it's been going on actually for hundreds of years, the Kurdish-Kurdish conflict. So, Turkey still doesn't want any Kurdish presence or existence in Syria, except, of course, normal citizens. They do not want the Kurds to have any power there. Now, of course, that dynamics changes. And maybe I'll talk about that in another episode between Turkey and PKK. PKK was the armed group that has been fighting Turkey, and that armed group now have come probably to its end. They linked the weapons, but the connection with the Syrian, with the northeast Syria, is really a strong connection, because Turkey accuses them to be PKK. And, of course, to me, they are not PKK. To the Americans, they are not PKK. To some, you're looking there for some, others, they are not. So, it's really, I'm also understanding that dynamics, I think, is really important. But the Syria has really became this place now, which is really, I would say, in the term of a chaos with the withdrawal of the Iran, or the weakening of the Iran, and, of course, the removal of the power. So, Assad was really, mainly backed by Iran and Russia. I think Russia is managing to stay in Syria the way it was, just kind of just really, and this is something, you know, I think a normal person wouldn't believe it. And, for me, I think if I did not do this type of work for like 10, 11 years, it would be very difficult for me to see that, because to me, you're allied with someone, you stay in alliance, if you lose the war, then you lose the war. But, let's say, in the Syria context,

Russia was bombing Syrians along with Assad. Russia was even actually bombing just probably two days before Assad fall, the fall of Assad. I mean, they did, let's say, bomb all the bridges that leading to Damascus to prevent advance of the HDS. And, of course, a lot of the airstrikes would even, you know, severe, severe ones, you know, Russia participated in that, probably they also participated in the chemical, but I don't know. But really, you know, it's like, geopolitically, they are okay to just switch sides. And outside with HDS, which is Al-Qaeda, which is, you know, a Russian military bases in Syria to keep Syria, and it is because that's their only naval and military base in the Middle East, which then they give them a lot of strong geopolitical presence, and they cannot afford losing it. So, I think in most Syria, also the new regime is like, you see how pragmatic they have been, pragmatic from, I mean, if you just watched the interview that al-Shaad did, or Julani, so, Abu Muhammad Julani is the leader of the HDS. He was a leader in Al-Qaeda, he was in Iraq, was detained for, well, detained, we detained for years, I think five years or so in Iraq, and then he left Iraq, he came back to Syria, established the HDS.

So, he said, "Jihad is an Islamist, he's a terrorist, I mean, you can call him whatever you want, but he's really, he belongs to that terrorist group that was created in both Iraq and Syria to cause all that damage," and he was a leader there, and you know, you cannot see him as, let's say, someone who completed a college, you know, a human rights degree in Geneva or, I don't know, Australia. So, he's definitely a jihadist who came to power with, you know, with bloodshed, and then, after he took over the power in Syria, you see kind of also the change. I mean, the US had a bounty of 10 million dollars on its head, and then the next day you see somebody from the State Department going and meeting this person, the Damascus, try to see the new, you know, new US position in Syria, like, so for you, for a normal person like me to see this happening, and for you to see this happening, I mean, if you are paying attention to see that happening, that "Jihad is making his way all the way up to become head of a state," you know, I think this is not only crazy to see, but it's dangerous to see, you know, we've seen, let's say, the Islamists in Afghanistan taking power, Taliban taking over Afghanistan. Taliban is the group that, basically, September 11 was, they harbored the people who done it, and they also did it. So, so it's like to see even US enemies, US want to be one of the strongest countries, you know, withdrawing from Afghanistan, you know, to give power back to the Islamists and to give power to the terrorists. These things stuck with me, and it really is hard for me to comprehend, and I think also a lot of just, you know, for a lot of people, it's really hard to just stay in these constant discussions of things that are not, you know, attaching your life directly. Let's say, you know, Afghanistan doesn't attach an average person life here in, let's say, in Nebraska or in the US, but it does, it does affect, you know, when on the global stage, it does affect when the next crisis happens. It does affect when the next, you know, big things happen. Now we see the Islamists have taken power in Afghanistan, which is a huge country. Now we see the Islamists and the Jihad have taken power in Syria, and then in many other countries, in fact, also that even some of them are very close to the US, these countries also are led by Islamists, and in a way they also separate, or they contribute to separate of the terrorism globally, but still US work with them, whether they're batteries, whether they're Turkey, whether some of these other countries who, who actively support terrorism, who fund terrorism, but then, you know, still, still we see them being close allies to the US. And, you know, for me, someone who, who watched this again, watched this, and then see, for example, why a country like US will be dealing with Qatar, who's, who supported really, who supported ISIS to start with, who supported HTS, who supported Hamas, who supported, you know, all this Islamist group, and continue to support. If you would, AlJazeera, for example, just for hours, you will see that Qatar's position is to, is to bring the Middle East to more, you know, Islamic control with the Muslim Brotherhood. So, for example, Qatar being one of the, the pools of the Muslim Brotherhood, Turkey being another pool. And then you see them also working with the US. You go to Washington, I've, you know, I go to Washington for advocacy, let's say the causes, I believe in it, and you see a battery there, spending, you know, millions of dollars. You know, even I was told, for example, they are renting a whole hotel and, and, and bars and clubs, you know, to invite people to it. People with influence, you know, they are buying people in Washington so that they can stay, they stay doing what they are doing in the Middle East, but also stay close allies to the US so that they can get protection, get weapons, get all that. So, you know, I think the idea of this podcast is to try to bring some of these things to people, to the normal people, because I think normal people do have some power, even though it could be very small, because a lot of us just can understand things, but we cannot change them. That's why really I wanted to do, you know, I want to do this, I want to help people, help the viewers to look more critically, more into the details of how things are happening, and in some cases, you know, even the countries, let's say we live in like United States or bigger countries, they may be not willingly, or maybe, maybe not understanding the depth of the decisions they are making, but the decisions do impact the other people. And what's happening in Syria, as I said today, is a result of this geopolitical shift, or again, so I would say, you know, the world being okay with Assad, just that he stays in power, whatever he does is okay, until he was gone, and then now you see the Islamists coming taken over, you see the this shift in the power dynamics in the Middle East, and then you wish the course could be, could be again, you know, tens of thousands of people like Alawites, like Druze, like the Kurds, like the Yazidi minority, for example, in Syria, that's another, another situation, for example, Yazidis were about 80,000 people in Syria, up until the Syrian, the Syrian war, and now there's only a few thousands who live there. So this war brings huge changes with them. These huge changes usually impact, you know, the the weak, or the weak in the community, or the one that, or the weak communities, especially in places in the Middle East, you know, where you see the weak community suffer. It has like, you know, clear and strong complication for the way they live. I, so I think, I think on the on the on the Syrian situation, I think one of the one of the one of the one of the segments for this podcast, I wanted it to be the situation in Syria, and what really happening, and what really happening also in terms of the dynamics or the new dynamics that we see between Israel and between Turkey.

Of course, this is something that let's say President Trump, I think, I think highlighted in one of his, one of his, one of his speeches that that, you know, Turkey is strong military, but but today that a strong military is actually at the border with Israel. So Turkey now is, is effectively in Syria, while Israel, for example, on the other side is trying to establish, you know, control over southern Syria with the Druze areas, but also outside the Druze areas in Syria. And this is really a new dynamic, I would say that's that play that's playing. Israel, for example, is probably one of the biggest actors in the Middle East and geopolitically speaking, traditionally had war with Iran and with Iran proxies, there were Hezbollah, Hamas, Iraqi militias, etc. But now that dynamics, the whole dynamics are changing with Iran withdrawing to really to try just to protect Iran as a country, you would maybe still some influence or actually some influence in Iraq, but they are not as strong as they are. But, but with Turkey now really taking control over Syria and then with the Islamists in Syria taking control, Israelis seeing, of course, new threat to its existence.

Because I think, and I think they're right, they're right about that, you know, they're right about having an Islamist or a jihadist at your border. This is, Assad was an enemy to Israel, but he was a different type of enemy because, you know, Assad's main goal was, you know, was his regime, was continuation of the regime was really, you know, his whole thing against Israel was just a label to me, I think. Because he really never acted in term of, I mean, he acted in a way, maybe against Israel, just passage of the weapons to Hezbollah, for example, with the use of the Syrian territory for Iran and for the Hezbollah and its proxies, because you also benefited from both from Iran and Hezbollah to stay in power. So he did that for them, but he did not act as strongly against Israel, for example, you know, landing a dark attack, even though, let's say, part of Syria are still occupied by Israel and Juhlan. I think the new threat that the Islamists bring to Israel is really, is much more severe, is much more serious. And I think Israeli is seeing that and what they do in reaction to that, of course, what they do, they, Israel is trying to support the Druze to establish a region in the south of Syria.

And I, you know, one would only just wait and see how that plays out, but they, of course, the Druze has a community who's at risk of, let me clean things if the Islamists get there, because the Islamists, I would say, the jihadists, in their political and ideological view, they view anyone who's an outstanding Muslim as an infidel. I mean, eventually, they may, of course, I think, and I think this al-Shara, after changing his name, when he's trying to be as practical, as pragmatic as possible, because he knows that ruling a country, you know, ruling a country is not like ruling a jihadi group, and you have to abide by certain norms and rules to stay in power. And that, and I think he has been trying to do that. So to this advantage, he has been trying to not, or to act less as a jihadist, and more as a state person or a normal leader. And I think he was, you know, more or less successful until the recent last couple of days of Alawite, the Alawite situation where we see, again, the mass crimes, and the mass crime taking place against the community. And, you know, I saw myself videos of people getting shot in the street, people getting killed for, you know, like people, doctors, engineers getting killed. And you clearly can see, you know, this kind of terror is just going in the streets and walking and killing people. So it's really not as a state, as a police, as going after insurgents, as they claim that they're going after as a supporters and backers, and as an insurgency. You know, that, I would say that kind of the Israel worries about its own safety and existence, and then the support for the Druze and the in the region. And it's really also very kind of, you know, you have to also understand that from, let's say, from the geopolitical point of view. So why, why is the support for the Druze, why is the support for the Kurds? Maybe 50-50, not really complete support for the Kurds, but we see, let's say, really strong support for the Druze in the south. And we really almost see no support for the Alawites in Syria, even though they go after, you know, they go and we have not seen, I think, a single statement from any country when hundreds of the Syrians, Alawites, have been killed.

And you don't see anything because, you know, I think, of course, you know Druze being with the Israelis for Israel protection, Druze in Israel have been contributing citizens, have been able to live in the Israeli structure with safety. And I think there is, in many ways, there's like mutual benefit for both. There's mutual benefit for Israel and mutual benefit for the Druze of Syria because Druze of Syria do not know what's coming.

I think the last thing they want an Islamist group to come and take over them who, who view them as infidels and nonbelievers. So to them as a community, being with Israel is better. Now, of course, you know, if you are in the Middle East and you say that, that's like seen as a crime when you say, okay, a community see themselves to be with Israel because then they get the treason, they get, you know, anti-nationalism of Syria, for example. But, but eventually community, I think, you know, also take the decisions based on what they see is better for them. So maybe for the Druze, maybe they see it's better for them to be with Israel, not with Syria, with the new Syria especially. I think if you, if you look to the Alawites, as I said, you know, nobody cares anymore because they say they're main backer. And it's also a mistake here. So this generalization, and one thing also I want to do is podcast is like we generalize things all the time. We generalize things like we take positions on one thing and we always support that position, whether it's good or bad. And yesterday, A Yazidi friend here was telling me basically, you know, if you want to do a successful podcast, you have just to stick to one ideology and you have to kind of be the one who just, you know, pump argument into that and support of that, that ideology, like a single or kind of a single view ideology. So it is like, I don't think that's me as a person. I don't think that's also objective. So that's why I'm, I think it's really important to look at the situation from that radical view or from one view, let's say I support the new Syria because I support the new Syria only because Sunnis have taken over power. And if you look into, let's say the, I'd say the Arab world or the Muslim world, like, yes, I think mostly many people or many countries even will support new Syria only because now the power has shifted from the Alawites or let's say from Assad to the Sunnis. So they will support it regardless of what they do. You know, there are other people who will stay against this new Syria. It doesn't matter what it does because, you know, they see, you know, Sunnis taking power. It's like, you know, they shouldn't have taken power. But I think it's more than that. It's more complex than, you know, that one single, single view or single ideology for the Alawite, for example, there is that basically people saying Alawites were like Assad people and, you know, Assad lost. So they will lose. And of course, you know, maybe, maybe few Alawites have committed crimes. Maybe they did. Maybe they did support, or some of them did support Assad, but the fact is, you know, considering them all being Assad supporters, which they call "fluid Assad," you know, I think that's really, it's not right and that's not objective. But you see, for example, the international attention to what the roots go through, what the Alawites go through, and what the Kurds was a little bit different. I think that's another situation in Syria that is really important because the Kurds today, or the Kurds and the Arab allies in Syria, they control about 40 percent of the land in Syria. And that 40 percent of the land also happened to be the richest internal of the oil resources. But the threat to that, of course, the threat to that, so that's kind of part of the story of the Northeast, but there's also the other part of the border, which the zone that Turkey has been trying to establish, which they already did also, let's say in place like Afrin or to Abiyat, where they did establish this, at least that's like 30 miles or 30 kilometers wide corridor. And of course, they committed ethnic cleansing and genocide in this area. I mean, I know about that situation because I was talking to people there when Turkey came into this northern areas of Syria, basically, they just pushed people out of their towns and their cities and they replaced them with the Arab Sunnis. And that was having Afrin until Abiyat and other places. And that's also the A.C.D. Kumti had more than 20 villages there. So I know that happened today, A.C.D. Kumti also happened to the Kurds in that region. So and now with Turkey really seeing the Kurdish territory as a threat.

And also, I think it's not so what Turkey says to the world, basically, the PKK is a threat to all national security. Turkey is like, this is our border, we have to protect it. And in a way, U.S. and Europe are, of course, U.S. is their U.S. presence in the northeast. It's not something that Turkey supports. Turkey wants U.S. to leave there. And I think, I mean, they've been asking the U.S. to leave for years. They've been saying, we will take control of the whole region. We will take control of, for example, of the ISIS presence. There's another topic that's really important. I think these topics require a whole a whole one hour of discussion and bring also experts about it. For example, the ISIS presence who are still in Syria, more than 10,000 ISIS prisoners are inside the Syrian or SDF presence. But also, there's about more than 40,000 in the whole camp and other ISIS family camps where a lot of people have been radicalized and could post threats. So U.S. presence in that region, I think, serves multiple purposes. One of them is prevention of release of these ISIS prisoners. When Turkey says, okay, we're going to take over northeast Syria, but I think there's much more into that because Turkey really see, because they don't want any Kurdish presence in that region, just the way they don't want any Kurdish independence in the northern Iraq. When the Kurdish referendum happened in Iraq, Turkey, Iraq, and Iran all come together to close that and to prevent the independence of the Kurdistan region. I think the same thing we see in Syria. There's a lot for Syria. So the way the West, let's say, approach the northeast Syria, I think so far so good. I don't know how committed Trump will be for U.S. presence in Syria, but that's really also a great implication for that. I think removal of the U.S. forces from northeastern Syria could allow another massacre, or massacre just the way we see with the Alawites right now, against the militants of HDS and others will commit mass crimes against the Kurds and against the minorities in the northeast Syria. So the role of U.S. forces from that region will, I think, will have an immediate catastrophic human right violation against these communities. But for U.S., I think it's also more than that more than just protecting, let's say, the human rights. Of course, it's not human rights. Again, I think personally, human rights is about five percent of what you see in geopolitics, maybe not more. I think about 95 percent of decisions made in the geopolitical and political space have nothing to do with human rights, all these more percentage where human rights is seen as an important element. But on the, let's say, practical side as well, U.S. speaking northeast Syria, it's served multiple purposes. It's served multiple purposes in terms of protection of Israel, for example, because the Kurds are seen as friends, natural friends to Israel. Minorities, oh, are seen, let's say, natural friends to Israel. And how right that is and how minorities in Israel, let's say, can work together or not work together. I mean, that's a different story. But in general, the minorities and the Kurds, they have less hatred against Israel and they probably less serve those who try to destroy Israel as an existence. So I think Israel is also pushing very hard to protect north of Syria, indirectly, at least. I was very worried about, you know, tramwood-drawing forces from north of Syria. I personally thought this would be one of the first decisions he would make, is to withdraw from north of Syria and is to establish, you know, to, because that was his political message. We want to leave and we want to bring U.S. forces back. We don't want to want new wars. But we want to leave just the way we, you know, happened in Afghanistan, for example, or happened in Iraq before that, which also resulted into ISIS coming back to power when U.S. withdrew from Iraq. You know, that resulted into ISIS to come to power. So I thought that would happen in Syria, but I think with the new dynamic in Syria, maybe U.S. will stay. I don't think U.S. is as committed to Syria, but that might change. I mean, you know, we'll see what Trump, what Trump to do is going to do on that. So it's really, it's really on Syria. I think this new, this new shift in the geopolitics and the geopolitical of Syria brings a lot of threats with it, whether you're talking about dynamics between Israel and Turkey, if you're talking about the internal dynamics between the different ethnical and religious groups inside Syria. I think the chance of a civil war in Syria is very high. It's probably the highest since the beginning of the Syrian revolution in 2011.

I think the, of course, some people think this is just consolidation of power, that, you know, the new regime in Damascus will crush the insurgencies. And there are a lot of groups having created inside Syria for now, trying to put the Syrian power in some areas. So this is maybe just a phase of consolidation of power, where there will be massacres, just like what Assad is when he came to power in the 70s. You know, a lot of massacres, which eventually ended up with him coinciding the power and being the guy in charge of the country for, you know, a man and his son for like 20, for about 50 years. So we could see Syria could be going into through a phase of consolidation of power, which is going to bring with it a lot of tragedy, especially I would say against if the regime in Damascus is successful, it will crush all the minorities groups, basically any decision making or any power within this group. I mean, they can probably live as citizens, but without really any power. All we see Syria descending into a civil war. And I think that's probably more likely because, because the current regime in Syria is not as strong as they think they did come into top of the regime in Damascus.

And they were successful in that, but I don't think they are as strong to, you know, to be able to rule and to be able to fight against these other forces within Syria. Probably the Alawites are the weakest one. That's why they're going after the Alawites first. Not the Druze or the Kurds, because if they go against the Druze, Israel will come in their defense. That's why they decided probably not to go after the Druze first. They decided to go after the Alawites because the weakest ones with Iran being at the weakest position, Hezbollah being at the weakest position, they decided to go after Alawite. But still probably Iran has some Jews in that region, probably Hezbollah still has some presence and some Jews in that region. While Hezbollah did lose against Israel, but I think they will not, they will still try to be at least present in Lebanon and Syria with some influence, at least when it comes to the Alawites. And these massacres of Alawites continue for the next couple days. I think we could see more intervention from both Iran and from Hezbollah and support of the Alawites. I think on the course, it's a different story, totally different story. The Syrian regime manages to, of course, by the support of, let's say, you know, the regime's friends like Turkey. And of course, as we discussed, Turkey, Turkey is really one of the main objectives in Syria, is well, two truly objective, a Syria that belongs to Turkey, which they already got. And then a Syria without any president of the courts, any political, and geopolitical president of the courts, which they are trying to get. I think, I think on the later point, Turkey may convince Trump to leave Syria eventually. And I think that probably, I mean, as I said, I thought that's going to come in the first couple of weeks. We also saw, for example, the DOD was putting proposals for withdrawal from Syria, actually planned to withdraw from Syria, like within a month or two months and three months, and they presented, so they had plans ready to withdraw if the president decided to do that.

Now, it was said that that was a normal, kind of a normal thing to do for the DOD to be ready. But I think everybody expects, you know, trying to take a decision on Syria. And I think if we did not have this whole, this whole crazy situation between Hamas and Israel and, you know, Turkey and let's say Turkey, Syria versus Israel, right now, you know, we could have seen no draw of the Americans from the North East Syria. But that will depend on, that will depend on how really you approach North East Syria. I think North East Syria, even though they have great, probably the greatest fighters that anyone ever had, the SDF or the group that's called Syrian United Forces, you know, that group was created as support of the U.S., but they were probably one of the best fighting groups in the region, very organized, but, and they managed, I say, to stop ISIS, but eventually to also cause the defeat of ISIS in Syria. But they will not be able to stay in power against, you know, NATO's second largest or strongest enemy. If Turkey decided to come to North East Syria, they will be able to take over. I mean, again, it's going to bring a lot of human tragedy with it, but they will do it. And what's tough right now is the U.S. presence there. So, you know, we are here to see what, how the U.S. will play decisions or its cards in Syria.

No, what is good usually, really what is good, not what happens and what's more likely to happen in Syria, you know, if I was to wish, I would say, you know, establish a region just like what we have, the Kurdish region in Iraq, a similar Kurdish majority area or minorities, Kurdish plus other minorities area in the northern Syria, northern Syria. I think that will serve stability for the home of the East. I think that will make the region a better place. I think we'll make even Syria a more moderate, less Islamist, less jihadist country. I think we'll give the U.S. a lot of tools in that region and a lot of power in that region to prevent big, you know, I'm not in favor of, let's say, countries going and occupying other countries, taking over the resources, whatever. But I'm in support of a strong U.S. position in that region to prevent, you know, groups like ISIS, Al-Qaeda to be empowered because these groups do bring a lot of harm to the two humans in that region and to the whole world as a whole. So I think, you know, U.S. beings in that region and supporting the Kurdish majority areas to establish a region similar to the Kurdish region of Iraq, it has a lot of positive aspects, a lot of positive for Syria, for the region, and also for protection, let's say, for Israel as a U.S. ally. It does, and Israel saw that third coming, you know, they saw that connectivity between Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, and Hamas on the other side. It's really, it's really was probably the largest existential threat to Israel for, you know, since the 1973 war. And I think they see that coming. So they will try to kind of just break that continuity in one way for the Iran to have influence, but also they would, I don't think they would be very happy with Turkey and the Islamists are being on their borders.

With Turkish are being done, and also they say with the position of Erdogan against Israel, that that's been going on for years now. A lot of his positions are, you know, as radical as Hamas position against Israel. I mean, he does not see Israel as a legitimate country. He wants to remove of the map, just the way Iranian wants to remove of the map. It's just like the difference is Turkey is in NATO. They benefit from NATO. They benefit from Europe. So they are not as radical, but you know, I think ideologically and politically, they would also like to see Israel wiped out. So I think Israel will try to put Syria in another direction. And maybe they will be successful in pushing the U.S. to also support the Kurds in that region to establish that Kurdish region as part of Syria, but a new difference here. That's more like, I would say that's more like the current Iraq where different groups have power and you have shareable power in a very imperfect way, but they do share power and of course do have a strong position in Iraq and that serves the U.S. interests.

Thank you very much for listening to this podcast.